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I. REPLY TO DEFENDANT FLORENCE'S CLAIM FOR DENIAL 
UNDER RULE 49(e) 
P l a i n t i f f o f f e r s h e r a p o l o g i e s t o t h e C o u r t and t o t h e 
defendants i f he r p e t i t i o n i s l a r g e l y d i s c u r s i v e and ob tuse* The 
d e f e n s e of d e f e n d a n t s F l o r e n c e and King h a s b e e n b a s e d upon 
u n p r o v e n and c o l l a t e r a l f a c t s and when t h e d e f e n s e f a i l e d t o 
r e s p o n d t o t h e c l a i m of c o l l u s i o n , d e c e i t , f r a u d , m i s r e p r e -
s e n t a t i o n and g r o s s n e g l i g e n c e , i t a p p e a r e d t h e d e f e n s e d i d not 
unders tand t h e c l a i m s of t h e Compla in t . Due t o t h e l a r g e number 
of e r r o r s and t h e m u l t i p l e p a r t i e s invo lved in t h i s m a t t e r , i t has 
been very d i f f i c u l t t o be b r i e f i n making i t c l e a r . 
A r u l e h o l d i n g a P r o Se p e r s o n t o t h e "same s t a n d a r d of 
knowledge and p r a c t i c e as a q u a l i f i e d member of t h e ba r " would be 
a d e n i a l of P l a i n t i f f ' s F i r s t Amendment r i g h t s of o u r U n i t e d 
S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n . Such a r u l e would c e r t a i n l y empower t h e 
l e g a l p ro fe s s ion and t h e j u d i c i a r y as a d i c t a t o r s h i p . 
I I . REASONS FOR OSCAR HOWARD COLEMAN'S DECISION 
TO WITHDRAW HIS CLAIM 
The d e f e n d a n t s F l o r e n c e ' s and K i n g ' s i n f e r e n c e t h a t Mr. 
Coleman's d e c i s i o n was because he d i d no t b e l i e v e he had a c l a i m 
i s n o t t r u e . Mr. Coleman h a s s u f f e r e d f o r many y e a r s from 
S c h i z o p h r e n i a and has a g r e a t f e a r of t h o s e i n a u t h o r i t y and a 
g r e a t e r need f o r a p p r o v a l . T h e r e f o r e , he i s ve ry s u s c e p t i b l e t o 
any sugges t ions from those whom he p e r c e i v e s t o have a u t h o r i t y and 
may be a b l e t o c h a s t i s e him i n any way. 
His wi thd rawa l was caused t h rough i n t i m i d a t i o n from Lynn P . 
Heward t e l l i n g him he could not p o s s i b l y win t h e c a s e and could be 
sued by the defendants and, for sure, would have to pay their 
attorney fees if he remained a party in the claim. 
His needs and unrealistic fears from the intimidation caused 
his decision to withdraw his claim. He does not have the ability 
to make an evaluation of the facts which brought about the claim. 
Due to Mr. Coleman's mental condition, Plaintiff has been the 
decision maker of the family. His fears created by the intimida-
tion from these attorneys caused dissension and disrupted our 
marriage. 
III. REPLY TO QUESTION #1 OF DEFENDANT FLORENCE AND 
QUESTION #3 OF DEFENDANT KING 
At this time, the Honorable Judge Rodney S. Page and the 
defendant Attorney - Officers of the Court - through power abuse 
and Petitioner's ignorance of the law and its procedures, has been 
successful in preventing the relevant evidence which will reveal 
the chicanery perpetrated in this matter before the court. 
The defendants should not be allowed to dictate to the Review 
Court, as they have to the Trial Court, which rules and laws will 
be enforced and what evidence will be suppressed. This would put 
law and order in our state at great risk if they are allowed to do 
so* "To avoid a manifest miscarriage of justice" the Court must 
uphold Rule 56 of the Rules of Civil Procedures and Rule 4-501 of 
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration in the matter of failure 
to serve Plaintiff. 
Rule 103(d) of the Utah Rules of Evidence and the supporting 
case of State v. Stephens, 667 P. 2d 586 (Utah 1983) states: 
Exclusion. 
When evidence is excluded by the trial court, any 
error which may have resulted from such exclusion 
is cured when the substance of the evidence is 
later admitted through some other means. 
Also the supporting case of State v. Eldredcre, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 
15 (1989) states: 
Plain error. 
The first requirement for a finding of "plain 
error" is that the error be "plain", i.e., it 
should have been obvious to a trial court that it 
was comitting error. The second requirement for a 
finding of "plain error" is that the error affect 
the substantial rights of the accused, i.e., that 
the error be harmful. 
Support for this is cited in 15 other cases which would, thereby, 
give the Court latitude to admit the excluded memorandum and 
suppressed evidence. 
"To avoid a manifest miscarriage of justice", the review 
Court is empowered through Rule 2 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court to issue a writ of certiorari in this case: 
In the interest of expediting a decision, the 
Supreme Court, on its own motion or for 
extraordinary cause shown, may, except as to the 
provisions of Rules 4(1), 4(3), 5-( 1 ) and 45, 
suspend the requirements or provisions of any of 
these rules in a particular case and may order 
proceedings in that case in accordance with its 
direction. 
The "special and important reasons" of "extraordinary cause" 
being the Trial Court judge's failure to appoint a receiver and 
unconstitutionally impaired the obligation of Plaintiff's contract 
and made it impossible to collect the monies owed. Defendant 
Florence allowed him to do so without any argument. Had a 
receiver been appointed, it would not have mattered that three of 
the buyers had been released by the verified complaint. This was 
defendant Florence's argument when he asked Plaintiff to sign it. 
Defendant Florence's failure to have a receiver appointed set 
the stage for him, through deceit, misrepresentation and fraud, to 
begin the foreclosure actions which freed the buyers, the Logans 
and the Carloses, from their contract obligations. 
Due to t h i s foreclosure ac t ion , the Car loses , (Wayne, an 
entrepreneur business owner and ba i l bondsman for the Courts of 
Davis and Weber Counties and Kim, a Tax Examiner for the IRS) were 
able to discharge more than $32,000 in Federal and State Tax Liens 
and write-off a $21,000 debt due to unsubstantiated claims made to 
the Utah S ta te Nut r i t ion Program. These debts were incurred 
during January 1, 1981 to February 1984; the period in which they 
purchased a half interest in another day-care business, a cafe and 
b i l l i a r d parlour , and pledge for a b a i l bonds bus iness . This 
period was prior to the contract modification in March 1984, which 
increased the interest rate of which the defendants have inferred 
destroyed the business. 
Due t o the Cour t ' s dec i s ion t h a t the modification was a 
novation for Wayne and defendant F lorence ' s c rea ted deceptive 
value of the property foreclosed, the buyers assets were protected 
from d e f i c i e n c y judgment . The Ca r lo se s kept $36,000 of 
P l a i n t i f f ' s court judgment and took a $126,000 from the business 
during the 18 months of foreclosure. Had the business been placed 
in receivership , per contract terms, a l l of the c red i to r s could 
have collected. 
The foreclosure action made i t poss ib le for Kim Carlos to 
discharge more than $18,000 of personal debt through bankruptcy. 
The misconduct of Judge Page and the defendants netted the 
Carloses a considerable windfall while P la in t i f f l o s t more than 
half of her court judgment and got back a piece of property which, 
to make hab i tab le , requires more r epa i r s than i t s va lue ; l o s t 
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standing in the business community and suffered, and is still 
suffering, great health problems. 
At no time was the real property value ever represented to be 
worth $105,000. Defendant Florence was very much aware the 
contract was for a business with real property; the contract and 
the verified complaint he prepared stated this fact. 
The Honorable Judge Rodney S. Page should have disqualified 
himself form the proceedings of the Motion for Summary Judgment. 
His impartiality could be reasonably questioned since he had heard 
and rendered judgments in Case No. 39944, from which resulted the 
legal negligence actions of Case No. 43390. 
The contentions of the Complaint, the suppressed evidentiary 
facts, the disputed material facts, Court rules and case law does 
not support Judge Page's decision to grant the defendants Summary 
Judgment. 
This is a clear case of discrimination against the Petitioner 
and the defendants should be cited for their delaying tactics to 
deny the claim of liability and damages. 
The dispositive facts of the case justifies it to be reviewed 
as an extraordinary cause and should be expedited by reversing the 
decision and awarding of damages. 
Dated this 9th day of May, 1990. 
HELEN S. COLEMAN 
Pro Se Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the 9th day of May, 1990, four (4) 
true and correct copies of the foregoing Reply to Opposition Brief 
to Writ of Certiorari were delivered to the following: 
Carmen E. Kipp - (A1829) 
Robert H. Rees - (A4125) 
Shawn McGarry - (A5217) 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
City Centre I, #330 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314 
Thomas L. Kay 
Paul D. Newman 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Coleman, 
Pro Se Appellant 
